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11/15/79
TRILATERALISM AND THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM:
.AN EFFORT AT MANAGING THE ZIMBABWEAN LIBERATION STRUGGLE

·By Prexy Nesbitt*

•

,What we have achieved is a masterpeice as a politicodiplomatic exercise. No one ever believed that we could
get the internal leaders to agree to so much •.. whereas
we were alone, we now have the advantage of authentic black
nationalists defending our political position ... **
· The 1978 "Zimbabwe Rhodesia"*** ·constitution and subsequent elections of April 1979 can be interpreted in light
of trilaterialist principles.

The constitution and elections

'* Prexy Nesbitt is Research Secretary for the World Council of
Churches Program to Combat Racism.
He was previously Director
of the Africa Project of the Washington, D.C. Insti t ute for
Policy Studies. For two years he was the Associate Director
of the American Committee on Africa. He. has lived, worked,
and studied in the Southern African region for over 4 1/2 years
beginning in 1965.
(The views expressed are the author 1 s own.

J

**Co-Minister of Defense Picker K. Van de Byl speaking to an
all white, closed door audience when Muzorewa first began to
cooperate with Ian Smith's government. The Times (London)
May 8, 1978, quoted in Nazir Ahmad, Abel Muzorewa: An Autobiography, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.,
paper, 1979.
***ed. note:
"Zimbabwe Rhodesia''. is the name given the country
under the constitution approved by the white settlers.
Zimbabwe
is the African name - the name for a situation of true independence and majority rule.
"Rhodesia" is the colonial name, after
Cecil Rhodes, who led the first plundering expedition which claimed
the area for the British Crown; he became the colony's first
administrator.
In this paper, Rhodesia is used in reference to
the settler regime, especially the military apparatus.
Zimbabwe
signifies the African majority.
Zimbabwe Rhodesia is used
where appropriate in reference to the Muzorewa/Smith government.
Written for:

Trilateralism: Elite Planning for World Management,
ed. Holly Sklar. Forthcoming, South End Press,
Boston, Winter, 1980.

1

2

are not the creations of White Rhodesia alone.

They are

the result, also, of two historic initiatives by the West:
first, joint efforts by Britain, and the United States culminating in the 1977 Anglo-American plan for Zimbabwe and,
.

second, collaboration on Namibia between the U.S., Britain,
France, West Germany and Canada (the so-called Contact Group),
•

also beginning in 1977.

These initiatives are part of a larger

set of events which includes: the August 1977 African journey
o f then British Foreign

Minister David Owen and then U.S.

Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young; the February
1978 trip of Patriotic Front leaders Joshua Nkomo and
Robert Mugabe to Malta for talks with U.S. and British officials,; and the 1978 meeting of trilateralists Carter, Vance,
Mondale, and Brzezinski with South African Foreign Minister
Botha.

A host of politicians
and private organizations
in
.
.

the U.S. and Britain -- ranging from the British AngloRhodesia Society to North Carolina Congressman Jesse Helm's
tax-exempt foundation to the Institute of Aaerican Relations
a n d the Center for a Free Society -- have also had a hand in
shaping the so-called Internal Settlement.

In short to under-

stand events im Zimbabwe one cannot look within Zimbabwe alone.
The Zimbabwe Rhodesia constitution and elections are the
basis for an illusory (i.e. having the appearance of majority rule)
neo-colonial structure which would serve as an alternative to a
sei~ ure of state power by a genuine national liberation movement:
the Patriotic Front (PF), consisting of the Zimbabwe
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African National Union (ZANU), and the Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAPU).

Like the white settlers, trilateralists

seek to avoid an "excess of democracy" in Zimbabwe.

However,

the·· ·newly elected Prime Minister, the diminutive Bishop Abel
Muzorewa, and his white settler dominated Cabinet represent

i. 1.

only a modified application of the trilateral method to the
•

Southern African scene.
too !plainly cosmetic.

The constitution and elections were
They were broadly perceived as

resulting in the same white structure with black faces (Zirnbabweans have called Muzorewa a "blacksmith".)

Because

---

the elections of April 17-21 were judged 'neither free nor fair'
and because the "new" constitution maintains the white settler
community's economic and political hegemony, the hoped for
lifting of sanctions by the international community did not
follow.
Furthermore, the elections to "bring peace" to Zimbabwe
have neither ended the war not renewed the ragged economy.
On the contrary since the elections the· escalating war has
strained the economy even further.

The Washington p·o st

reported on September 30, 1979 that Zimbabwe Rhodesia's war
effortwascosting $1.6 million daily.

And the Salisbury

based correspondent for Th~ Economi·s t reported shortly after
the elections that it was the war-related problems -- the
transport bottleneck, balance of payments problem, shortage of
skilled labor~- that were creating a stagnant economy, not
application of sanctions by an equivocating international
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•

community.

"So long as the war continues -- and escalates,"

he wrote, "the capacity for increased production simply does
111
not exist.

There has been an accelerated call-up for military service
to bring the number of Rhodesian soldiers to over 100,000, an
increasing proportion of them being Blacks.*

On the other

side, by September 1979 there were 30% more Patriotic Front
guerillas operating inside the country than had been the case
only six months earlier.

The PF guerillas have succeeded in

bringing large tracts of land under their administrative control -penetrated only intermittently by large Augusta-Bell helicopters
-- and have carried out successful operations in Salisbury,
the capital.

Some 2,000 of Rhodesia's 6,100 white farms

have been abandoned:

2

whole communities have disappeared.

The period around the election itself witnessed high monthly
death tolls of 800 to 900 people and by~-Au<just 1979 that figure
\vould cl i mb to over 1,000.

At the same time some 1,000 or so

whites were emigrating monthly.**
There is an additional by-product from the war.

The

PF guerillas have succeeded in paralyzing the international
business community.

Foreign capital is watching as closely

as the PF, the telling statistics of white emigration, gross
*According to the Salisbury regime's Central Statistical Office,
as of April 1977, the total white population is 273,000. Blacks
number - 6, 340 -, 000. -As quoted in International Defence and Aid
Fund, · ·zimbabwe: Th·e· F·a c·t s About· Rhodesia (London, November 1979).
**The irrmr1·g ·r ·ati·o n figures are consistently exaggerated by the
Rhodesian Government in an attempt to retain what foreign
capital remains. Official figures state that since January 1979
the country lost 9,973 whites for the 2,268 whites who immigrated.
· (The ·s t·ar, Johannesburg, October 6, 1979.)

I
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domestic product and foreign exchange.

A recent report of

the United Nations Economic and Social Council assessed the
,

over-all situation in Rhodesia:

•

Many foreign interests are reportedly prepared to
expand their operations once the political situation
stabilizes. For the moment, however, very little
investment activity, foreign or local, is taking
place. During the past year, almost no new foreign
capital has been invested in the once dependable
mining sector and th search for new minerals has
3
practically stopped.
The Muzorewa solution has failed to achieve a central
objective of trilateralism in Africa: managing or at least
•
stemming the ad.vance of the radical liberation forces and, in

Henry Kissinger's words, "preventing the radicalization"
of the situation.*
In the sections below we shall discuss the following:
the political/military background to the April 1979 election;
foreign capital interests in Rhodesia; the elections and the
*Because of its importance a fuller statement of Kissinger's
t e stimony before the House of Representatives, International
Re lations Committee Hearings, (June 17, 1976) follows:
With the end of the Portuguese era in Africa, pressure
was building on Rhodesia, regarded by the Africans as
the last major vestige of colonialism. Events in Ang ola
encouraged radicals to press for a military solution in
Rhodesia.
With radical influence on the rise, and with immense
outside military strength apparently behind the radicals,
even moderate and responsible African leaders -- firm
proponents of peaceful change -- began to conclude there
was no alternative but to embrace the cause of violence.
By March of this year, guerilla actions took on even
larger dimensions. We sa~ ahead the prospect of war fed
and perhaps conducted by outside forces; we were concerned
about a continent politically and economically estranged
from the West; and we saw ahead a process of radicalization
which would place severe strains on our allies in Europe
and Jap an.
(p. 8).
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Muzorewa government; the ramifications of the Carter/Young
policy toward Rhodesia upon domestic politics, with a special
1'

focus on the gr©Wing role of Black Americans; and the general
strategy of trilateralisrn toward Southern African liberations
movements, as applied to the specific case of Zimbabwe .
•

Bac kgrbund· to the April Elections

On September 15, 1978, in a speech delivered in Maputo
President Samora Machel of Mozambique lamented: the Front Line
States* and Africa as a whole had allowed British and U.S. envoys
to deceive the Front Line Presidents; the latter had accepted
the intentions of the West as being one with those of Black
Africa in seeking to terminate the illegal Smith regime.

(A

white minority government led by Ian Smith defied calls for
majority rule by unilaterally declaring independence from
Britain in 1965.)

Even from the perspective of imperialism,

Machel pointed out, apartheid in South Africa, colonialism in
Namibia, and settler rule in Zimbabwe were all anachronisms.
Continuing his analysis (perhaps addressing himself to certain
of his Front Line colleagues), he observed:
Our candour and the sincerity with which the Front Line
states tried to advise the British and the Americans,
enabled imperialism to improve its strategy, enabled
imperialism to maneuver so that, till now, it has managed
*The five 'Front Line States' are: Tanzania, Botswana, Angola,
Mozambique and Zambia. At the 1979 meeting 6 f the Organization
of African Unity (OAU), the Front Line States were once again
endorsed to speak for and act on behalf of the entire OAU.

I
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to maintain the illegal Smith regime.
The main objective of the -imperialist-- action is
not to- overthrow -Smith. - ·The--·m ai·n -·objec·tive· ·of· :i ·m:p·e:ri·a1·ism
is t ,o 'des·troy 'the 'l "ibera'ti'on' 'rrjoverrient, _t o destr0y any

,

form of organization which enables the people to liberate
themselves.
Imperialist strategy has been, after all, extremely
coherent.
Imperialism has two operational detachments in Zimbabwe:
Smith and his lackeys and-- Great--Britain-- and -- its partners.
The-- operati·ona·1 -st·r ·a t·egy·- is·. .-a·1ways· ·to h·a·ve·- ·r ·e·a·d·y· two
·solu't ·i'on·s·: ·a·n· 'int·e r·n al s·o1·u·t i·o n· ·a ·n·d an i ·n:t·e rna·t i·o11·a·1· s·o lution.
When one of the alternatives is about to reach a
solution to the problem, imperialism sets in motion the
other alternative.4(emphasis ed.)
There is a long history of meetings, conferences, and
agreements which substantiates President Machel's contention
that imperialism always keeps these two solutions at the ready,
with the main objective being to nreve nb the Zimbabwean liberation
movement from gaining power.

Beginning with the talks between

Smith and Prime Minister Harold Wilson aboard the H.M.S. Tiger -held one year after Smith's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 -- and extending to the Fall 1979 talks at Lancaster
House in London (taking place as this article is being written),
here have been repeated Western efforts at negotiating a solution
to t he Rhodesian problem.

At times talks have been bilateral,

bri e f, informal, or secret, as when on August 2, . 1977 Andrew
Youn g had a chance meeting with Patriotic Front co-leader Joshua
Nkomo in Guyana and followed it up with a trip by Nkomo to
Washington and New York.

At other times, such as in the October

1976 Geneva Conference, talks have been formal, extensive and

involved all of the various parties, including the Front Line

•
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States, with the support of the United Nations.
',
For the Patriotic Front and its African supporters --

especially the Front Line States and, increasingly, Nigeria* -the talks and conferences are largely tactical.

That is, they

r are modalities which should assist in transforming the status
quo.

What President Samora Machel said in a 1978 speech to

members of the United Nations in Maputo could just as well
have been expressed by the leadership of ZANU or ZAPU.

Speaking

to the audience which included both a U.S. and a British delegation, Machel remarked:
We totally reject the idea that the path of armed
struggle and the path of negotiations are either
mutually-exclusive alternatives or contradictions in
the process of national liberation. We do not love
war but we believe that, when the contradiction is
antagonistic and insoluble, only war makes peace.
Our people have a saying for this: 'you can't make
tea without boiling the water.'
Talks are an important factor for victory but they
are not the decisive factor.
For Smith (and more recently for his "successor"/collaborator
Muzorewa) the talks and conferences, whether secret or open,
are means to try and pr·e serve· the exist·ing ·s tatus q·u o ·s itua·t ·ion.
*Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Australia were the countries which
pressured Britain into convening the Lancaster House Conference .i n 197~
Nigeria's takeover of British Petroleum just before the August
Commonwealth Conference was one more instance of Nigeria exerting
its muscle and showing its growing power as one of the "new influentials." See Carolyn Anderson Brown's article for further
discussion of Nigeria.

•
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To date, Smith and his colleagues have refused to consider
the means of genuine transference of power and the dismantling
of the mechanisms by which 273,000 , whites exploit 6340,000
Blacks.

Rather, they have attempted ·. to use the talks

and (abortive) agreements as part of a strategy to split the
.
de
.. : an d impe
Pi"Ft.

any growing momentum, diplomatic or military,

•

which the PF might be enjoying at a particular time.
For the trilateralist West, particularly the United States
(though by tacit agreementBri..t a:i:n, because of its 'responsibility
as the colonial power.'

is ·usually the central actor*) ·; the

meetings and talks up to and including Lancaster House 1979
signify a process of management.

Trilateral leaders would be

the first to say that the status quo situation of wnite settler
hegemony has to be altered.

But other experiences in Southern

Africa, especially in Angola, and throughout the Third World,
have taught them that the key problem is one of shaping the
nature of change, i.e. avoiding at all costs "chaos" (revolutionary
change) .

On July 3, 1979, Henry K-i ss ii nger was asked about his

plan for Rhodesia when serving as Secretary of State.

He

responded: "My plan was to co-ont the program of moderate evolutionary reform, that is to say majority rule and minority rights."
(Wasington Post).

Speaking from the same posture of managing,

Andrew Young a n swered a question about U.S. involvement in
Africa. by saving:
*According to the London Observer of October 21, 1978, this is
true only as long as the British are adequate to the task. At
the point at which the Lancaster Ho.use Conference a·lmost collapsed
over the issue of whether a new government should assume the costs
of compensating departing white settlers for the ir land, it was
a secret intervention - reportedly at the request of President
Nyerere of Tanzania and Shridrath Ramphal, the Commonwealth
secretary - by Carter and Vance promising the funds that salvaged
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I don't think you can blame us for that [the fact that
the war was still going on in Zimbabwe]. See we were in
a supportive role ·-- supporting Africa and Britain, in
trying to find a political an~wer to the problem, and I
think we have rema.ined true t o that.
But other changes
have come about that we were not in control of. 5
It is important to note one fundamental difference between the

.

Kissinger approach and the Carter/Young approach.
seems to be much more trilateralist.

The latter

Whereas Kissinger maintains

that the best thing to do with the radical nationalists (what
he calls the "ideological radicals," a category into which he
places ~1ugabe but not Nkomo) · is to i ·s olate them, Young and Carter feel
that i t is best to maximize contact in the belief that the radical
nationalists ultimately "want to share in the productivity of
the American way of life.''*
*(continued from previous page): the Conference.
I suspect
the Carter administration did not require much prodding to proffer
the funds -- part of a multi-donor program.
In fact~1 such assistance was planned under the Zimbabwe Development Fund envisaged
by Kissinger in 1976. To say that the funding was being done
at the request of the African parties just provides better cover
for the managerial initiat~ves.
*The anecdotal pastor Young illustrated this point beautifully
in a recent speech to the Houston Texas Trade Association:
I remember when we sat down with the Patriotic Front when
they agreed to elections run by the British and supervised by
the United Nations -- something which Ian Smith and Bishop
Muzorewa never would agree to -- one of the things that happened
was a big, burly guy comes over to me and put his hand on my
shoulder and said, 'I need to talk to you. '
I didn't know him.
As big as he was I was kind of nervous. He pulled me off to
the corner. He was in his battle fatigues, long bearded.
He was supposedly one of their military commanders from out
in the bush.
He pulled me off to ,the side and saiq, 'What
really happened to the Oakland Raiders?" I said 'what do you
mean?'
He said, "They were supposed to be Super Bowl this year,
what happened?' (Remarks by Andrew Young, Houston Trade
Association, May 18, 1979). Reprint available from United
States Mission to the United Nations, New York City.
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But differences aside, there is a consensus on one key
point regard.ing Rhodesia:. the neea. t o aainta in the interests
of the multin ational corporations operatin~ there in ·the" face
of the growing military threat fro~ the PFs fighting forces.
How great is that threat?

Is there anyp:>ssibility that the

Patriotic Front will take po,~,er through a military victory?
,

The thirteen years of war have been a bitter and cruel
affair.

The strategy used by the Rhodesian Forces -- similar

to that of the U.S. forces in Vietnam -- is to terrorize the
civilian population away from the support they have consistently
given the guerillas, whom they fondly call "the Boys."*

Some

indication of the extent to which this type of counter insurgency has failed is provided by the fact that the Patriotic
Front has today a pool of close to half a million refugees in
the·n~rghborl~gcountries of Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and Botswana
from which to draw political cadre and military recruits.
Likewise, the fact that South Africa is assuming an increasingly overt role in the war is a direct indication of the
Front's effectiveness.

It has been known and reported for

some time that South Africa is materially involved in the war
in Zimbabwe, just as it has intervened in Angola and Mozambigue.
South Africa continues to wage a war of agression against Angola,
both directly and through its extensive support of UNITA.

South

Africa has aided Rhodesia with equipment (in February 1979, for
instance, South Africa supplied Rhodesia with Mirage jets for
its attack upon ZAPU camps in Angola),

$50 million in monthly

*Please note: when this term is affectionately used by Zimbabweans,
they are making reference to both men and women in the Patriotic
Front's fighting forces.

12
bank loans

6

and with personnel.

But the South African military

is worried that Muzorewa's forces are outnumbered and outexperienced by the guerillas.

A spokesman
stated, ''I don't
,

see how they'll [Muzorewa forces] win unless they get more
manpower."

On September 24, 1979 Prime Minister Botha told

a Capetown National Party meeting:
We have an interest in the stability north of us.
If confusion and chaos are created for Rhodesia
by outside forces, I want to warn that the South African
parliament will have to consider what steps we :are going
to take because we do not want and we cannot afford confusion
on our borders.*
A month later, on October 22, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda
alluded to one of South Africa's "steps" to preserve "stability",
when he told a visiting Iraqui delegation how Z:a mbian forces
were (thus far)

"containing" some 1000 Rhodesian and South
African troops operating in Zambian territory. 7
South Africa is, indeed, very concerned about their "kith
and kin" to the north; but their concern is not altruistic.
•
Roodesia is,
as the International Defense and Aid Fund describes

it, a "sixth province of South Africa."

There will be more and

more troop commitment and escalated intervention by South Africa
in Rhodesia because:
*Cited in 1. the w·a shi·n gton p·o st, September 29, 1979. Another aspect
of the confusion Botha may have been alluding to is the growing
morale problem with Rhodesian security forces. The Lorldon
Guardian (August 29, 1979) pointed to an increasingly bitter
internecine quarrel when it headlined a story that the most
effective Rhodes .i an counter-insurgency force, the Selous Scouts,
were preparing "to resign and leave Rhodesia."
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Political and business confidence in South Africa is
inttmately bound up with the survival of Bishop Abel
Muzorewa. Whether South Africa sets itself on a path
of even moderate economic growth is now probably more
dependent on what happens at Lancaster House in the
next few months than on any other single factor. 8
11

Foreign capital is also assuming a more active profile in
Rhodesia.

The present Rhodesian economy is the product of

•

Western capital, South African capital, and, to a lesser extent,
of white settler farmers.

From the moment Cecil Rhodes first

planted his feet on Zimbabwean soil in 1890, Rhodesia has been
a "company" country.

As the Southern ~A frican Bureau of the

U.S. Agency for International Development acknowledged in its
Febraury 1977 repot:

The role of the multinational corporation in the Rhodesian
economy is dynamic and pervasive ... A concern of the new
government will be its relationship to these corporations
and the role it believes they should play in the future
Zimbabwe .•. larger firms produce over 80% of Rhodesia's
manufactures and most of these are probably multinationals,
integral parts of the world economy. (p. 273).
Observers report that many multinationals in Rhodesia have
announced recent cutbacks in operations.

It is in the mining

sector particularly where one finds striking cutbacks by British
companies like Johannesburg Consolidated and Lomagurdi Smelting
and Refining , a subsidiary of the Anglo American Corporation.
Earlier.·, becaus.e .o f..the. 1.97.7. repe.a l. of the Byrd. Amen.d ment, .*.

-

U.S. multinationals such as Union Carbide and Foote Mineral
•

Company were forced to curtail their chromite oroduction."
*The Byrd" Amendment, passed on November 10, 1971, had lirted
the ban on the import of so-called strategic and critical minerals
from Rhodesia, including chrome. On March 18, 1977 Carter signed
P.L. 95-12 Amending the 1945 UN Participation Act and halting the
importation of the Rhodesian chrome.
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It has been argued that the pressure of international sanctions
(passed by the United Nations Security Council on December 16,
1966 ' and extended in 1968 into a total economic boycott)
I

and subsequent investigation into alleged violations by the
U.S. Treasury Department have caused U.S. oil companies like
Caltex and Mobil to curtail their activities in Rhodesia.
But the real dynamics of the oil trade, i.e., indirect supply,
were accurately portrayed in a June 25, 1978 London Observer
feature; ''Oil Chiefs Bust Sanctions,'' by Colin Legum.

The

headline story describes how the companies, far from taking
the wait-and-see stance often reported, were in fact pivotal
supporters of the Smith regime and had been providing oil
to Rhodesia via South Africa (through subsidiaries and cooperating South African firms) throughout the period of 1966 to 1978.*
Slowly but steadily, information is emerging about the
economic and political activities of the multinationals.

Herschel

Rhoddie, the former South African government official who initiated
South Africa's Watergate-type scandal,** revealed that he
worked with leading executives of the Alleghany Ludlum Industries
(a large U.S. importer of chrome from South Africa and Rhodesia)
t .o. secre.tly ..c.o n.t r.ibut.e . over. .1 1/2 mi.llion. dollars to. Bi.s h.op.
*ed. note: Without these oil transfusions the Smith regime could
n~ver have survived; the economic and military machinery would
have ground to a halt. Besides Mobil and Caltex, collaborating
oil companies included Royal/Dutch Shell and British Petroleum,
51% owned by the British government. For more information - on
this see the excellent book, Oilgate: the Sanction· Sca·n d·a 1 by
Martin Bailey and his collaborator Bernard Rivers (Hodder and
Staughton, London 1979).
**This is discussed in Brown's article.
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Muzorewa and his lieutenant, James Chikerema.

In fact,

Muzorewa has been the bene ficiary of much company largess.*
. '.

What the foreign investors want in ,-Rhodesia is reflected in
this comment from an article in the 'Lb ndoh ob·s erver .of October 21,

1979:'' ••• to bring this nasty war to an end, and so save possibly
hundreds of thousands of lives, give the white Rhodesians
•

some chance of retaining a stake in the country and prevent
the economy from being totally wrecked as wer e thos e of Mozambique

and Angola.''

[Italics mine].

For the moment, the corporations

have lined up with the Muzorewa government.

Much of the.ir

activity in Rhodesia is channeled through their South African
subsidiaries or in tandem with the South African government.
Thus, multinational corporate interests often coincide with those
of South Africa.
r

Their corporate perspective is like that of
..

.

'

Kenneth Adelman, a noted African Affairs "expert" who recently
argued for more American military exp enditure in Afric a:**
Given this background of instability [in the current
African era], the economic development that both Africans
and Americans yearn for can only grow from a foundation
of security.lo

·

*Re cently, i t has bee n reported that Muzorewa received approximately
$100,000 from the Lonrho Corporation.9 During the summer of 1977
and shortly after his selection as Rhodesia's new Prime Mi nister,
Muzorewa and his colleagues were c o ntacted by a number of influential corporate executives. The Mobil Oil Corporation hosted
a reception for the Bishop in Ne w York and the Cummins Engine
Company flew him to Indiana to discuss his plan s for rebui ] ding
the Rhodesian economy.
**I hasten to add, though, that · the multinational corporations are
not just one vast leviathan. There are clear differences between
them and some corporate chiefs, like Tiny Rowland and Lonrho Company
(the London Rhodesian Company) seem to take a more long-term -more trilateralist -- view on the Zimbabwe Rhodesia problem (cont)
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He insists that it was the white farmers who made
possible the election that put Prime Minister Muzorewa
into power this year by organi?ing farm workers and local
people ·in the countryside, assuring them that there would
be no repercussions if they voted and transporting them
to voting places.*
Muzorewa's election as the first black prime minister of whiteruled Rhodesia was the second stage of a process which began
•

.

. \

'

••

when the white settler community -- representing 4 per cent
of the entire population -- voted approval of a constitution
which guarantees white privilege under a facade of "majority
rule.**"

Muzorewa's election was an exercise carried out by

the occupying colonial force in F.hodesia; much of the country
was under martial law. - David Caute described the election in
his article in The· Na·t ·ion:
the army and the armed police made it clear that the y
were in business to get people to vote .•• in Matibi the
majority of the voters were herded in by patrols .•• in
Joni village in Mangwerde, people were warned that if
they did not vote their village would be bornbed ..• 11 12
While Ian Smith and the ,-1hite settler leadership were still
.

.

.

. .
.

..

.

.

.

'

. .

*than do some of the less sophisticated and worldy actors like
E. ~ . Andrews and Alleghany Ludlam of Pittsburgh. The stakes are
ver y high for Tiny Rowland (perhaps, this accounts for a
re l atively more long-term perspective). The Guardian (London)
reported November 11, 1978 that Lonrho and another c ~mpany,
Li ebigs, between them owned over "two million acres of ranching
land."(continued from previous page)
*White - Rhodesian Farmer Colin Cook interviewed by Carey Wnfrey.
New York T·i mes, Thursday, Septembe_r 27, 1979.
**As the American Cammi ttee on Afric·a recently commented: "There
is not a single chapter in the entire constitution which demonstrates even the potential for a transition to the majority
rule in Zirnbabwe. 11 11
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basking in the . glow of their new-found ·pr o t ege s ,
ment began to unravel within the African commun i ty.

The private

armies of Reverend Sithole, Chief C~irau and Muzorewa -- the
parties to the internal settlement agreement signed with Smith
on March 3, 1979 -- have been a source of terror and misery to
the Zimbabwean peasantry since early 1978.

The flames of

¥

alientation and anger toward the purported '' authentic black
nat i onalists"* felt by Zimbabweans (especially those in rural
areas) have been fanned by actions taken by the "new" government: extending martial law provisions, detaining more people,
practicing even more vicious torture than had occrred under
the p revious all-white government.
Under the emergency regulations of 1976, continued by

the

Muzorewa government, "special court martials" or military courts were
created. By 1979 there were a minimum of 1,851 political prisoners,
i.e., those convicted of supporting the liberation struggle . (caught
carry ing food on the road, for example); thousands of others imprisoned .as criminal offenders.

According to the London Observer

(March 16, 1980), '' as many as 300 Africans were secretly hung after
the introduction of martial law in September, 1978.

Further, under ·

the state of Ficergency regulations surrmary executions -were often carried out in the

fie l d by the six different forces on the government side,
including Auxiliary Forces like Muzorewa's private army.** With
this record of atrocities in mind:
*This p hrase is taken from the quote at the top of the first page
of this article.
**Even Muzorewa's colleague was not immune. In August members
of Reverend Sithole's private army charged that government
troops and airplanes massacred over 300 people as they stood unarmed, waiting for the government. troops to pick up their discarded weapons.14 Recent and new information about the character ·
·
·
(continued)
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More and more Zimbabweans call Muzorewa and other black
beneficiaries of the internal settlement Zvihlbgawasungata -the Shona term for "hunting dogs." As Zimbabweans explain
the significance of the term: It is a stray dog with no
owner. Anyone who cares can take it hunting for the pot.
Once it catches an impala or ~ -hare and kills it, the
hunter takes the meat home and chases the dog away. It
does not eat any of the meat it kills.13
The coalition government is coming apart.

Starting with

· the resignation of Co-Minister of Justice Byron Hove, and
continuing through some dozen separate cases, key members of
both Muzorewa's UNAC party and of his government began to
resign in protest.

The Bishop's government is not adequate

to the task of neutralizing the Patriotic Front and rebuilding
the economy.

Recently, a white farmer in the Rhodesian Highlands

expressed his disappointment in Muzorewa's conciliatory approach
at the Lancaster Conference: "I think he's made a great mistake.
He put all his cards 6n that table."
The essence of the situation, however, is that the mistakes
are less those of Muzorewa's, than those of his backers.

The

Bishop's nominally independent government cannot address the
hardships of war, wlii~ e ,privilege, and rural exploitation
whjch all Africans face daily.

I t cannot confront the reality

of deeply institutionalized racism.*

Hence, while it might have

*A good example: the Muzorewa government has explicitly said that
it will leave the present economic infrastructure intact. The
state-run Agriculture Finance Corporation in 1975 gave an average
line of credit to Rhodesia's 6,000 white farmers of $18,000. It
made available an average credit of $2.00 to the 600,000 African
farmers. For more on this, see Michael Bratton, ''Settler, State,
Guerilla War and Rural Underdevelopment in Rhodesia," Issue
Spring/Summer 1978 pp. 56-6.
(contintued from previous nage) and actions of Muzorewa's security
forces is available in the -·detailed study by the British AntiApartheid Movement, Fire Force Expo·s ed: The Rhodes·i ·a n ·s ·e ·c ·u·r i t
For ce ·s · ·a nd · Their Role in Defena·i ng wh·i te Supremacy London,
October 1979). One most significant conclusion of this study
is : "the Rhodesian security forces, in short, are incapable of
playing any positive role in a genuine transfer of power to
the people of Zimbabwe as a whole , and must be disbanded ."
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been an ade quate "African solution" the 11uzorewa gove rnment
as constructed by Smith, the National Front, and their Western
allies fails as an enduring neo-colqnial solution.

•

Says Byron

People in our country have been looking for an evidence
that the agreement is leading toward majority rule. Now
they have evidence to the contrary. Far from adjusting
toward majority rule, Smith and hts machinery are trying
to cheat us, to take us for a ride, and to cheat the
whole world.
[Th~y
- believe in] t he substance of -power
remaining in white hands, with the shadow of authority
passing to blacks.15
. .

........ ...

. .... ... ..

...

.. .

.

.

.

As Ho T,le indicates, the world is watching events in Zimbabwe,
the United States as closely as Britain.

Within a nine month

period, all of the major actors in the Smith/Muzorewa government
visited and lobbied in the United States.

The major media,

especially television, began to give regular coverage to Zimbabwe;
some, notably the wa·s h·i ngtbn Pb·s t and the Columbia Broadcasting
System, augmented the number of its personnel stationed in Africa.
Shortly before resigning from his United Nations post,*
Andrew Young responded to the question posed by EnCbre, a Black
American magazine, "Ho,., important do you thi.nk Rhodesia will
be as a campaign issue?"

He said:

Very important. Because the Republicans have decided
that Zimbabwe ·is the new racial code word for "Let's
keep the niggers in th ~ir p lace.'' In . 1968, you
remember, it was crime in the streets," in 1972 it was
"busing ~r" - in 1980 it is Rhodesia.l 6
The debate over whether to send an official election observer team from the U.S., the elections themselves, the visits
o·f Smith and Mu·z orewa to the· ·u·. s·. ·, · th·e · ·i ·l leg·a l· tr·an·s fer· of
*On August 16, 1979 Andrew Young submitted his resignation to
President Carter after ha ving held an unauthorized meeting with the
Palestine Liberation Organization's observer to the UN .
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a number of u.s .... -rnade Huev helicopters and Cessna airolanes
-

-

J..

to Rh'"t:>~i-:a via Israel* · -- all these events took place in rapid
succession in 1979.

Each of them presented the Carter
,....,,

I

Administration and its program for Africa with a new set of
domestic challenges.
•

Beginning with the 1975-76 mobilization protesting U.S •
intervention in Angola and continuing into the Carter administration, prominent Black American individuals and organizations
have been carving out a role in determining the shape and
direction of U.S. policy and action in Africa.

The publication

of Kissinger's "whites are here to stay" policy memorandum;**
revelations about the CIA's activities in Africa (extensively
chronicl~d in books like John Stockwell's· In· Se~rdh. 0£· Enemies:
A CIA Story, 197 8 ); and the 1976 Soweto uprising in South Africa
galvanized Black and mixed organizations towar.d r .enewed levels
of activity.

In 1977 the NAACP sponsored a major factfinding

trip to Africa and issued a -report - calling for sanctions against
. .

.

. .

.

. .

. .

. . .

.

*Jim Hoagland, "lL Bell Copters Said Smuggled Into Rhodesia,"
wa·s nington Post, December 15, 1978. Also see, p·i ·r e Force Exposed:
The Rho·d e·s ian· Securi·t y Fo·r ces and Their R0·1 e in· oe·fend·1·n g· Wh1·te
Secur.i ·ty, op. cit.
**ed. note: The 1969 classified National Security Council Study
Memorandum, NSSM 39, presented a range of policy options for
Southern Africa. Kissinger pursued option 2 (dubbed the "Tarbaby"
Option -- after the Uncle Remus story) which recommended a "tilt"
to the white regimes. Its key premises were that South Africa
is and should remain the dominant regional power; that Blacks
cannot gain political rights through violent action; and that
"the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive
change can come about is through them." The approach was twofold: counter-insurgency to defeat theliberation movements and
affectionately nudging the whites to make minor reforms in order
to enhance stability. NSSM 39 is reprinted and analyzed in
Mohamed A. El _Khawas and Barry Cohen, eds., · The Kis·s ihger· ·s tudy of
Southern Africa (Conn: Lawrence Hill, 1975).
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So.u th Africa as well as Rhodesia.

Andrew Young's demonstrated

concern with Africa in his highly visible position of UN
Ambassador helped many Black instittitions deepend their awareness and sharpen their position.

But above all, it was the

founding of TransAfrica which signalled the dawning of a new
. period of Black concern with Africa.*

Founded in 1977, an

outgrowth of the 1976 Black Congressional Caucus' A·f rio.an
American ~1anifesto on Southern A·f r·i ca (an official declaration
endorsing the concept of armed struggle by the Southern African
liberation m0.v ements) , TransAf'r ica rapidly became ~~ a nationallybased membership organization functioning as a Black American
lobby on international affairs.
Thus, the Carter Administration, while attempting to
implement its trilateralist solutions

to

what it calls "the

arc of crisis stretching across Southern Asia to Southern
Africa," has to contend with the domestic ramifications of
policy decisions.

When the State Department permitted Smith,

Sithole and Muzorewa to visit the U.S. in October 1978 and July
1979, mass counter demonstrations were held in every city in
which they appeared.

When President Carter considered lifting

the sanctions against Rhodesia in the spr i ng of 1979, as
directed. by. the .1 .9.7 8 .C ase-Javi.t s. Am.e n.dmen.t , . he. w.a s. confr.o nted
*T~ere is no intent on this author's part to assert this is a new
development. On the contrary, the long history of Black .American
concern and involvement with Africa and the Caribbean -- seen
in the work of leaders like Marcus Garvey, W.E. Dubois, Paul
Robeson, Malcolm X, and Alphaeus Hinton --- is a subject which
is in need of more exhaustive attention . ... The -- difference is
that with the Carter administration the ·pote·n ·t ·i ·a1 for influence
is greater, largely because Carter owes an elector al debt to
Blacks for having received over 85% of the Black vote in 1976.
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with
a
"m·
a
intain
sanctions''
campaign
organized
by
TransAfrica,
.
.
.
,
'· l_

the Washington Office on Africa and some thirty-odd other groups
orga nized into a coalition called the Southern Africa Working
;

Group.

'

Black American publications like the· Amst·e rdam· News and

the Detroit Chronicle, and media organizations such as the
National Negro Publishers Assocation systematically pressured
Carter to abide by the March 8 UN Security Council decision
which declared the election fraudulent and urqed
member states
-·
to refrain from sending observers.
The potential si gnificance of the Blae k American community
in influencing Western policy toward Africa was underscored by a
November 9-11 Conference on Southern Africa sponsored by the
British-American Ditchley Foundation.

This quiet counterpart

to the Lancaster Conference was convened for 25-30 "distinguished
individuals" from W.e s.t ern E.u r.o pe , . Jap.a n. an.d. th.e . U.• S.•.*. in order
*(continued from previous page) Not only is thls a strengthened
Black American constituency. It is a Vietnam-sensitive Black
American constituency; people who, like most U.S. citizens, are
disinclined to be involved in another Vietnam-like intervention.
On this see Michael Klare, "The New Interventionism: Curing
the Vietnam Syndrome," The N·a ti·o n, October 13, 1979, and a novel
by Randall Robinson, Director of TransAfrica, called· Th·e Entancipation of Wakefield Clay (Bogle l'Ouverture Press, London, 1978).
Also see "Resurgent Militarism" by Klare et. al. in this volume.
*Among the participants were: Keith Douglas Scott, Australian
A!Pbassador to South Africa; Christooher L.ai ·d·l aw., Cha:i tman of British
Petroleum; Anthony Tuke, Chairman of Barclays Bank, President of
the British Bankers Association, and a Trilatenal Commissioner; Neil
Forster, Director of Br·istbw Helicopters; Anton Rupert, Chairman
of the Rembrandt Group
South Africa, - and Director
- of Companies~
of the South Africa Reserve Bank; Francis Vale, Public Affairs
Director of Rio Tinto Zinc; and the Man aging Director of Royal
Dutch Shell. Attending also were Richard Moose, U.S. Assistant
Secretary for State for African Affairs; Shiro Saito, the Asia
Area Chief of the Japan Economi·c Journal; Jerome Caminada, Foreign
News Editor of the-London Times; David Harrison, Producer for
BBC Television; Chester Crocker, Director of Afri c an Studies at
the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International
Studies; and William Foltz, Director of the Council on Foreign
Relations' Africa Project.
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"to focus on the questi.o n of coordination of Western Democracies'
policies, and ways in which they might help bring about effective
long-term solutions to the se~ious problems of the area [Southern
'

Africa]".

Several Black Americans, among them TransAfrica's

Director Randall Robinson, were invited.

When they declined

the invitation because no Black South Africans had been asked
•

to participate*, the Ditchley Foundation began frantically
"combing the woods" (Ditchley's words) to locate Black Americans
who might cooperate.

This incident illustrates the critical

importance Western policymakers and corporate strategists
..

..

. .

..

..

..

'

. .... .

attach to winning Black American legit·i mi·zati·o n of their
activities on the African continent.

In addition, the atten-

dance by leading corporate executives, diplomats, media chiefs,
and academics signifies the urgency with which they are trying
to develop new strategies toward Southern Africa hand in hand
with a rationale for public consumption.
Lobbying by Black groups and traditional progressive allies
like the American Committee on Africa (called ''liberationists"
by the CIA-linked George town University Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), is not easy.

Besides the

perennial problem of inadequate financing, TransAfrica and
other groups have to compete against a sophisticated, interconnected, and well-financed - lobbying effort being -waged by
*Later one Black South Afr'ican ''industrialist", ' i.e. factory
worker, and one ''Cape Town Colored" were asked to come.
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various forces hoping to see the existing Muzorewa government
recognized and sanctions lifte·d immediately.

Among the U.S.

forces actively promoting the Smi th/Muzorewa
o.p tion are: from
,
.

I

the corporate world, Union Carbide and Allegheny-Ludlum Industries;
from the Congress, Senators Dole (Kansas), Helms (North Carolina),
Ha:-,rakawa (California) and Representatives Ashbrook (Ohio),
•

Schweiker (Pennsylvania) and De Concini (Arizona); from the
church community, the Texas Methodists and the Christian
League of Southern Africa; and from the political 'right',
many of which maintain full-time professional lobbyists,*

the Liberty Lobby, the Ameri~an . Rhqdesian Association, the
.
the American Security Council, the Coaliti on f or P,eace Throuqt
Friends of Rhodesia . and the Association of Americans to Save
stre:i~~
~~ -

J~

Africa.

Many of these U.S.-based pro-internal settlement forces

have international links.

For instance, as mentioned above,

Allegheny Ludlum's president, E.F. Andrews, collaborated with
the South African government in making secret payments to
Muzorewa. **

~he ..F rien
'
d so f Ro
h d esia,
'
' closely linked
Inc., is
'

~

.

~

.

*Some indication of the resources available to the !·professional
lobbvists (Neville Romaine is the most famous Rhodesia lobbyist)
is seen in a recent revelation about lobbying in Wash~ngton
to get more U.S. arms for King Hassan and Morocco. Afri·c ·a· News,
October 19, 1979, reports that chiefly thnough the D·.c. · public
relations firm, DGA International, Morocco spent over a million
do l lars in the 1978-79 year attempting to buy the support of
the U.S. government and the public.
**Andrews' perspective is quite clear. He said in 1976: "The
question is what .can the private sector do with an e ye to keeping
Rhodesia .. in the Western sphere as opposed to the Soviet and
Cuban sphere?" Afri·c ·a ·.. Ne'ws .,.. October . 25, 1976. For the full
story see· The Chri·s ·t ·i an s ·c ·i ·e n·c e Monitor, August 9, 1979,
and South~rn· African Magaziiie, July/August 1979, p. 21.

•

•
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to the official Rhodesian Information Office which maintains
an office in Washington in spite of th~ s~nctions-

CSIS

(mentioned above), a major promoter of .Smith and a moderate
;

Black solution, was found to be directlv
.... linked to Britain's
Institute for the Study of Conflict, which in turn has direct
17
links to British police and army training institutions.
(See
· the notes following Peter Thompson's article for further discussion of these ties).
It is within this matrix of domestic and international
forces that the Carter Administration must try to apply its
trilateralist p rinciples to the Zimbabwean national liberation
struggle.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security

Advisor and first Director of the Trilateral Commission, said
to the 1979 Annual Convention of the American Society of
Newspaper Editors:
In the mushrooming cities of the Third World, congested
and rootless populations are more susceptible th~n ever
to political mobilization. Nationalism is increasingly
imbued with ideological content, intensifying the desire
to assert both national and social goals. ·
Cumulatively, traditional global relationships are undergoing profound changes in a context of extraordinary
diversity. The role of the United States in that context
is paramount, but no longer p·r edominant.
. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .
It follows that our central goal must be to· import posit·i ve
direction to· change by creating for it a stable and increasingly cooperative framework. 18 [emphasis mine].
How does the U.S. manage to cooperatively play a "paramount,
but no· 1o·n ·g er pr·e dotninan·t 11 role?* · Several ·a pp·r oa·c he·s are -vi·s ·ible
*What did Brzezinski have in mind? Webster's· New World oi·c tionary
(College Edition) defines paramount as "ranking higher than any
other, as in oower or importance; chief, supreme [italics mine].
Predominant means having "ascendency, authority, or dominating
influence over others. [ed. note: It would seem Brzezinski had
confused these terms until another nuance is shown this time
in The Arn·e rican Heritage Dictionary of· th·e English La·n gua·g e.
The second definition of predominant is: "most common or conspicuous;
prevalent." (Emphasised).]
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in the Carter response to Congressional pressure to lift
sanctions during the Spring of 1979 and in the U.S.-British
relationship in organizing the Lancaster House ·constitutional
,

Conference.

First, in exemplary trilateralist fashion, the

Carter Adrninistratj_on permits Britain to play the "Matt Dillon"
marshall role at Lancaster House, with the U.S. appearing as
•

the faithful deputy "Chester''.*

Second, Carter makes certain

that to whatever extent possible the U.S. is given very low
profile, role playing the silent deputy as well as the faithful
one.

Third, the Carter and Thatcher Administrations pursue

steps which assure them maximum flexibility, for in the postVietnam era it is flexibility and not raw muscle power which
characterizes the winner.

The appointment of Lord Carrington,

the British Foreign Secretary, as Lancaster House Conference
Chairman, insured that trilateralism and corporate interests
would be well served.**

The Lord served as Britain's Secretary

of State for Energy in 1974 and was the Minister of Aviation
Supply from 1971-74.

He is now or has been a director of the

following multinationals:· Rio· Tinto· Zinc· corpor~tion, Australia
and New Zealand Bank, Hambros Bank, Barclay's Bank, Amalgamated
Metal Company and the Cadbury Schweppes Company.

And if this

background i~ not enough to ensure that he is a good, skillful
and "ne.u.t ral.". ch.a .i rper.s .o n, . h.e . h.a s_ .t he. ad.d i.t i.o na.1 · ·g.u ali£ i .c .a tions
.

-

-

*The reference is to the famed American TV ~Jestern Gunsrroke. Dillon is
a giant blockbuster. Chester is diminuitive but faithful to
his leader.
**ed. note: Carrington is seen as the guiding light of reason
in Thatcher's Conservative Government in so · as international
politics are concerned. His appointment as Foreign Secretary
was a sign there would be little, if any, break with the policies
of David Owen, his predecessor in Callaghan's Labor Government
with which the Carter Admininstration Had had goon .rapport.
•
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of being a past member of the Trilateral Commission (See
"Who's Y\Tho on the Trilateral Commission."*and the· current president
of the British-Iran Society.
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Charlie Cobb, a journalist covering the Lancaster House
Conference, described the third approach -- flexibilitv -. quite aptly when he explained British move~ at the conference:
In deciding its next move meanwhile, the British government is wrestling with conflicting pressures from African
states on the one hand and right wingers in the Conservative Party on the other. Last week's party conference
[showed] there is still strong sentiment tha·t the Muzorewa
government should be recognized. Thatcher's government
does not dissent from this go~o but seeks maximum flexibility on timing and tactics.
U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, employed the same
approach when he explained Carter's June 7, 1979 decision not
to lift sanctions.

Besides emphas±zing cooperation with

Britain, his remarks were filled with phrases like "not
rushing forward", letting "the situation evolve," maintaining
"the ability to communicate with all the parties to the conflict."
He commented that whatever one's interest in ideology, all
concerned shared one common positive feature: a desire for
''peaceful change in Southern Africa.''

In short, the Carte~/

trilateral approach is to make the best of a tension-wrought
high-stake situation, like Zimbabwe, through accomodation rather
than confrontation.

(Like Muhammad P_li .the trilateral preference

is to ride the ropes rather than get in the center of the
rin·
but.
... 9 . and
.. . , ~un~h··1t··
_ ....
.
. ·) ··
*See Evercle11', Sklar,. "~vho' s y,]ho on the Trila.t'era.1' .c"ommi'ssion"
in Tr·i 1·a t~·ra'J.1 i ·sm·: Elite Planning fbr World .Management, 1980).
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t"1hatever the outcome of the Lancaster Conference* -which will see either new elections including the Patriotic
Front or a deal struck between Britain and the Muzorewa
government, however, inadequate -- there are certain conclusions we can reach about the West's strategy for Zimbabwe
and about the broader question of trilateralism and African
liberation movements.
Trilateralists attempt to defuse conflict.

Their strategy

is that of initiating dialogue with their enemy -- certain
that ultimately the sheer economic hegemony of the international
capitalist system will neutralize, by coercion and cooptation,
the ideological fervor of the nationalists.

The U.S. and

Britain are maintaining positions in the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
conflict which maximize their flexibility.

'

They are distinguishing

between short-term and long-term objectives.
to see a Zimbabwe run by the Patriotic ~ront.

Neither wants
But both govern-

ments -- unlike the right wing within the Tory Party (the Conservative Party headed by Margaret Thatcher), or that in the
Uni.t .e d. S.t ate.s . 1 .ik.e ..the. Amer i .c .a n. Enter.-n ris:e . .In.s .t .i .t .u t.e .fo.r · ·Public
*The Lancaster House Conference which began in London September 8,
1979 was a ninth attempt at a negotiated solution to the Rhodesian
problem. Although officially hosted by the British government,
the conference was the product of a compromise with African nations,
especially the Front-Line states, at the August Commonwealth
Conference meeting in Lusaka. All parties were present at the Lancaster Conference includina rnilitarv representatives from both the
Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian government. Besides the European
members of the Commonwealth the Lancaster conference also clearly
had the full backing of the Carter Administration.
J

....

-
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Poli.cy Research (AEI) * -- would at the present moment stop
short of heavy and direct military intervention to prevent the
Patriotic Front from coming to power.

Unlike many in their

own constituencies, the Carter and Thatcher administrations
argue that in the long run the Patriotic Front, especially
the Joshua Nkomo element of the Front, can be managed •
•

U.S.-British strategy vis-a-vis Zimbabwe pursues another
approach which is reflective of the essence of trilateralisrn,
i.e., the use of regionally influential countries like
Tanzania and Nigeria as power brokers in managing change.

That

aporoach counts on manipulating the very real pressures felt
by the front line states.

New African (September 1979) quoted

'.

Julius Nyrere, the President of Tanzania, as having said that
. ''·

the rea s on he decided to back the British Lancaster House initiative was that it was the last chance for a peaceful settlement
*AEI, with a Board of Directors which includes people like Melvin
Laird, William Colby, Barry Goldwater, Clark Clifford and
John Johnson of Eb·o ny magazine, openly argues for a higher U.S.
military profile in Southern Africa because of Africa's vital
role in maintaining U.S. global interests. Although AEI stops
short of advocating commitment of U.S. combat forces, it
nonetheless urges increased planning preparation and expenditure
so as to have such an option easily available at various locations
in sub-Saharan Africa. See Palmer, ''U.S. Security Interests
and Africa South of the Sahara," · AEI Defen·s e· Review II: 6, 1978,
pp. 2-43.
Also see the forthcomin9. report by Bob Lawrence and Holly Sklar,
tentatively titled, U.S. Africa Policy ·f or the· 1·90o's: wh·at· the
Think T·a nk·s · ar·e · Think·ing -- covering AEI, Georgetown Center for
Strategic and International Studies as well as the more liberal
"Rockefeller Commission on Southern Africa and Council on Foreign
Relations - winter 1980, Africa Project, Institute for Policy Studies •

•
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and that if it failed he could ''foresee Rhodesia becoming
another Mozambi'q ue ! "

He went on to give 'h is assurance ·that

the Patriotic Front would not be an obstacle to the new initiative.
I

Patriotic Front leaders want to make their own decisions independent of the West and even the Front Line States, or their
socialist allies; but they are dependent on the latter for
· sanctuary and political and material support.
What is behind Nyerere's comment?
wants to see ·the war end.*

On the one hand, Nyerere

Just as earnestly he is committed

to seeing genuine majority rule in Zimbabwe.

On the other hand,

Nyerere is faced with a Tanzanian balance of payments deficit
expected to reach $350 million by the end of Fiscal Year
1979/80.

Tanzania is awaiting a decision about needed supple-

mentary financial assitance from both the International Monetary
Fund {IMF) and from the World Bank, to which it is heavily
indebted, giving the World Bank a larger and larger role in
development planning and financing.

Debt pressures increase

the leverage ·w hi.ch the trilateralist West currently holds over
''new influentials'' like Tanzania.

(See article by James Phillips

on the IMF) •

*The war has been long and costly to Tanzania which has provided
the PF with support and training facilities. It has been even
more costly to Tanzaniats neighbor to the South, Mozambique.
At the time of this writing for instance, Rho·desian mercenaries
led Portuguese settlers, ex-Frelimo {the governing Party) supporters and - South ·A fricans, and captured the central town of Macossa.
{Th~: Guardi~n, London, October 23, 1979).
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Zambia and Botswana face similar predicaments, only
their situations are ~orsened by their historical economic
dependerice upon South Africa.

So too is the case with

Ang~~~~

and Mozambique whi.ch inherited not just poverty, underdevelopment
and war-time destruction, but also economies which were deliberately tilted so as to serve the Witwatersrand (South Africa)
.

•

.

.

..

.

.

.

industrial mining complex.
.

Add the costs of daily military agression, vicious bombings
and helicopter forays from South Africa and/or Rhodesia* ···
which cost the lives of some four Mozambicans or Angolans
and many Zimbabweans daily; the 150,000 Zimbabwean refugees
which the Mozambican economy is sustaining; add the 500 million
dollars in railroad and other revenues Mozambique has lost
since it closed its border in compliance with the UN sanctions
against Rhodesia in March, 1976; and a stark picture emerges
of the pressures upon the Front Line States.**
.

.

... ...

.

~

.. . . . .
. . . .

. . . .. ......
. . . . . ,•

'

..

.

.

'

~*South Africa and Rhodesia both have raided refugee camps and
PF quarters in Zambia and Botswana reaching even into the Zambian
capital Lusaka, to attack, for example, Nkomo's residence. But
consistently the brunt of the most vicious agression has been
reserved for sites in Angola and most especially, Mozambique.
During the London Conference Salisbury cut off shipments of
corn· from South Africa via the Southern Rhodesia railway to
Zambia, for added leverage over Zambian President Kaunda. See
Michael Holman, "Why Salisbury is Squeezing Kaunda," Financial
Times, October 24, 1979.
**ed. note: Military attacks against the Front Line States
went on throughout the London Conference: "Troops of the Zimbabwe
Rhodesian Government have killed about· 60 Rhodesian guerillas
and three Zambian civilians in raids into Zambia •.. The attack,
the third since talks began in London eight weeks ago, was
started yesterday by air and ground forces . and .ended today'',
Rhodesian rnili tary hea·dquarters said. · (New York· Times, November 4,
1979).
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The trilateralist states play upon these pressures in
their quest to harness the radica1 nationalist fervor of the
Patriotic Front's ar1ned struggle. ,.
•

The Trilateralist., approach in Africa today faces a grave dilemma. .
Domestic constituencie~ prohibit the use of traditional solutions, such as military interventions -- which, as in the
case of Vietnam, do not always prevail.

At the same time

the liberation movements of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa
have developed a momentum which poses a radical threat to the
world capitalist system.

Thus, trilateralism turns to new

partners and new solutions: ''new influentials" l ike Tanzania
are used as peace agents, the defenders of "stability" and
"world order".

Colin Legum, a veteran participant/observer

of events in Africa, recently summarized the trilateral approach
in Africa quite succinctly when he wrote:
This new Western approach to the problems of the region
contained five major elements. First, every stage of
planning and implementing the two initiatives involved
close consultation with the African states, most directly
concerned-.- the five Front-line States (Tanzania, Zambia,
Mozambique, Botswana and Angola), as well as Nigeria.
Second, in the case of Rhodesia and Nambia, the leading
liberation mo.v ements (the Patriotic Front and Swapo,
respectively) were brought directly into the negotiating
process. Third, the stated objective was to achieve
majority rule. Fourth, the agreed aim was to defuse the
violence; while ·not condemning the armed struggle, the
premise of the diplomatic approach was that armed violence,
was not necessarily the only road to majority. rule. Fifth,
explicit opposition to the introduction of big power politics
into the region.
(The justification for the Anglo-American
role was that both ·countries were already involved in the
area and could use their leverage positively. Meanwhile,
no new foreign powers should be brought in as this would
complicate the negotiating process and impede the achievement of majority rule.)21
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Trilateralism will persist, devising other strategies,
calling on other countries.

As Samora Machel,quoted earlier

in this paper, states: "When the internal solution doesn't
work, they turn to the external one."
But the liberation mo.v ements also have their strategies
•

and counter-strategies.

By the ±r very nature, the participants

in liberation movements besides being excellent teachers are
also excellent students.

Recently Patriotic Front Co-President,

Robert Mugabe, answered a auestion about the common work
of ZANU and ZAPU.

As with the PF's consistent demonstration

of flexibility at the Lancaster Conference, the response
by Mugabe showed that the 1-vest' s trilateralism is among the
subjects he has mastered.

He said, showing patience and

confidence:
We try to work on a political level against the
strategy worked out by Britain and the United States.
Since the Kissinger Plan, Geneva Conference and the
Anglo-American proposals, we resisted the bid to create
a nee-colonial state in the country. We have also had
the same diplomatic drive on the Zimbabwean question.
That is at the political level. The joint [military] ·
operations that we envisage are intended to ~alance the
2
coooeration
we
have
at
:~
the
ooli
tical
level.
.
rhe s a me patient and strategic deliberation was demon ~trated by the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA)
Commander, Josiah Tongogara, when he was asked what the London
Lancaster House Conference meant to him:
To us, London is definitely our second front. What
I mean by second front is that we have the home front
which is the front for physical confrontation, and th~n
we have the London front, which we term a peaceful
front. In the home front, whenever we go to the battle,
you put on your uniform, get your kit bag and your gun
and everything. Now here in London you put on your suit
and a tie and then you go and talk. So it's a peaceful
front. And we think that we don't mind that we have it
h~re in London . We could have had it anywhere , even i n
Zimbabwe, or Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia. But the fact
is that this conference is a product of what is happening
on the home front.23
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The wry "commandante" also shared with his post-Vietnam/
post-Iran/post-Nicaragua audience a portion of the ZANLA "historical imagination", the ZANLA sense of history, when he pointed out
that ZANLA came into the London talks concious that it was
their forces, they as part of the Zimbabwean people who had
created the historical circumstances which had birthed the
•

Lancaster House Conference.

With a calm which could only come

from having been a participant and a leader in the bush throughout
not only the Zimbabwean but throughout most of the Mozambican
guerilla struggle as well,

he responded to a query that ZANLA

was not coming to London as the winn~r .· of the war:
When the Rhodesians declared UDI in 1965, Wilson said
he was not going to send troops, but if the situation
inside Zimbabwe deteriorates and there is a need to
intervene, the British are going to intervene. What
is happending here at Lancaster House is that the
British now want to intervene. They think they want
to send their administration, they want to take over,
because there is something going on.
It is the war
that makes them think so. We could have refused to come
to talk to the British. We have lost nothing. We are
making progress every minute inside Zimbabwe. And I
can assure you, if we had remained in the bush and
said continue, we forget about London, we would still
be going to win. 24
*On December 26, 1979, Tongogara died in an automobile accident
near Chimoio, Mozambique. He died one day before the Rhodesian
ceasefire was to go into effect.
Some indication of the esteem
held for him by the ttozambican : leadership is provided in the
following extract fron President Samora Machel's tribute to
him presented at a Maputo funeral ceremony:
When Commander Tongogara died we did not want to believe
it • . . . We are all born, we grow and we die. But not all
deaths · are the same.
Some deaths have litttle impact.
Others weigh so heavily upon us that it is hard to bear
the weight . . • . Our people did not want to accept it. O~r
youth refused be believe that Commander Tongogara was
dead. All wanted to see him march again, in combat,
commanding with the dynamism which was so natural to him.
His military colleagues of the Mozambique People's
Liberation Forces (FPLM) even today do not believe
that Tongogara is dead . They cannot accept it . They
accept and believe only, that he is silent, that he no
longer speaks, but that his life goes on . . . . (continued)

\
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Tongogara had gone beyond being a Zimbabwean. He was a
fighter of the Mozambican People,'s Liberation Forces -he was Mozambican. Tongogara was a fighter of the
Tanzanian forces -- he was a Tanzanian. He was a fighter
of the Zambian forces -- he was a Zambian . • • .
I spoke to him on December 24, two days before he died, in
the company of Vice-President Muzenda. We spoke at
length on the problems of Zimbabwe, with all frankness.
And we were proud to observe his correct perspectives
concerning the Patriotic Front. He spoke not in the name
of ZANU, but in the name of ZANU-ZAPU, he spoke in the
name of the Patriotic Front. We applauded this.
Because of his work, Tongogara is a national hero of the
People's Republic of Mozambique. We all die. But
Tongogara had a merit, a merit which we don't all have.
He died without betraying, he died without selling himself,
he died without being corrupted. Fighting always for
the good of his people.
This is what we ask of the members of ZANU. This is
what we ask of the members of ZAPU. This is what we
ask of the people of Zimbabwe. This is what we ask of
the Patriotic Front. This is the moment for unity.
Farewell, friend Tongogara. We marched together, we
fought together and we won together. We will continue
to struggle. We will liberate Southern Africa. We will
create happiness in Southern Africa. This was the cause
to which you dedicated your whole life. We will continue.
Farewell, friend Tongogara.

5/26/80
Postscript - 1
The months between September 1979 and March 1980 witnessed
a renewed and concentrated effort on the part of the Trilateralist
,
West to manage the Zimbabwean liberation movement. The Patriotic
Front emerged from this contest with successes in two major
new arenas:
•

1)

the diplomatic arena; and 2) the electoral

arena, where not only did the Patriotic Front persevere through
a rigged electoral process but it went on to decisively win
the election themselves.
As indicated earlier the Lancaster House Conference began
on September 8, 1979.

Throughout

the various stages of the

negotiations - the constitutional discussion, the cease-fire,
the elections and the transition phase - the manner in which
the British, Lord Carrington in particular, conducted the
discussions led many to suspect that the British strategy was
to provoke the Patriotic Front into a walk-out so that a
•

separate legitimizing solution could be then worked out with
the surviving African participant, the "Blacksmith", Muzorewa.
It is critical, however, from the outset that the
Lancaster House Conference be placed within a broader context
before critically analyzing its component elements.
The diplomatic struggle for fifteen weeks from September
to December 1979 should be viewed within the context of 1) the
exhaustion of the Rhodesian settler forces and of the Front
Line States;. 2) the growing contradiction between Britain/USA
on the one hand, and the white supremacist communities of

•

•
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Rhodesia and South Africa on the other, vis-a-vis the future
of white minority rule; and 3) what form a continued Western
I

economic presence would have (given the importance of Southern
Africa to the capitalist world system) after new political
arrangements would be created to satisfy, but contain, African
•

nationalist aspirations.
The short term objective

of the Front Line States as the

Lancaster House Conference began was clearly to end the
guerilla war.

For all the countries concerned the costs of

maintaining the war were simply too high.

For Zambia in

particular, continuation of the Zimbabean guerrilla struggle
would have meant the end of the Kaunda administration whether by Rhodesian military conquest or as a result of
internal Zambian contradictions and tensions.
In addition the April 1979 Rhodesian commando raid into
central Lusaka and the takeover of Lusaka airport had
succeeded in seriously damaging ZAPU's operational
headquarters and storerooms.

Even during the Lancaster House

talks there were thirty combined Rhodesian raids in fifty
days from September to November 1979. 26
But the long term objective
was a quite different matter.

of the Front Line States

Muzorewa was totally unacceptable

to either the Front Line States or Africa generally.

(In

July 1979 the OAU passed a formal resolution not recognizing

Postscript - 3
the Muzorewa government and stating that the Patriotic
.

Front was the sole legitimate representative of the people of
Zimbabwe.)* Thus, it was that the, Front Line States saw a
successfully completed Lancaster House Conference as a progressive development towards the objective of dethroning the
"little bishop". As President s ·amora Machel put it on December 23
•

just after the signing of the Lancaster House Agreements in
a speech to the Diplomatic Co~ps in Mozambique:
We are meeting here to say: the tobacco farmer's
regime is finished.
Smith does not give orders now,
Smith cannot commit aggressions against the People's
Republic of Mozambique. Smith has been defeated.
Smith has been written down in the history of shame.
We are here to say:
the Smith/Muzorewa regime has
ceased to exist. Muzorewa no longer governs.
Muzorewa went to London to sign the death certificate
of his work and his government. Muzorewa went to
recognize the illegality of his own government. He
went to recognize that his elections were a farce,
he went to recognize himself as a puppet.
Throughout the Lancaster House talks there were other outside
forces that were important.

Besides the Front Line States

and Nigeria, the Commonwealth Secretariat played a key, if
not crucial, role from the time of the Lusaka Commonwealth
meeting in August in Lusaka through to the final decision by
the Patriotic Front leaders to initial the final document.
Indeed so central were the interventions by the Guyanese
Commonwealth Secretary General, Mr. Shridath Sonny Ramphal,
that experienced observers of the whole Rhodesian scene called
*This move by the OAU was wholly unanticipated and unacceptable
to the West. The United States especially lobbied the OAU
to keep the resolution from being passed. Such a move by the
OAU "new influential" was a step outside of the shelter of
what Basil Davidson calls "the Anglo-American umbrella."

•
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called Ramphal "the man who saved the Rhodesia deal."2 8

Time

and time again it was Ramphal who interpreted the African
interests or advised the Thatcher administration as to how
to respond to various deadlocks or crises in the negotiating
p r ocess .
,

On December 22 , 1~79 the ubiquitous Daily Telegraph
added its bouquets to an international press coverage which was
strongly hinting that Lord Carrington should receive the Nobel
Peace Prize for having staged a successful Lancaster House
Conference .

That day the Daily Telegraph headlined that

"Lord Carrington had pulled off Britain ";s greatest diplomatic
coup of the decade ." 29

The banner article went on in the

last sentence to concede that President 1,1yerere of Tanzania had
performed in a "constructive and vital role in bringing about
the Lancaster House talks and keeping them going ," but basically
the article was in harmony with an international press position ~;
that the ''terrs '' had been brought to heel , peace was achieved
and London had emerged triumphant from the talks.
Nothing could have been a more inaccurate statement of
the case.

Within a two month period the British press in

particular would turn up mater ial which would indicate the
desperate legnths to which Br itain was willing to go in order
to manage the outcome of the talks.
show the extent

The relevation also would

of collaboration between the British government

and the Rhodesian intelligence.
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What was revealed first in the New Statesman
and
then in the Sunday Times (London) was that the standard government surveillance and phone tapping mechanisms were mobilized
to the widest possible extent to insure that Carrington would
pull off the coup of the decade.
·

What was revealed by the

papers was that (under direct orders from the Prime Minister
and Lord Carrington) every hotel room, every car, every home,
every toilet, every key person, every visitor, in all the
delegations would be bugged and monitored.

Further, it was

shown that in order to interpret the African languages and
dialects and incidentally keep the Rhodesian intelligence
informed (also giving them the upper hand), the British engaged
Rhodesian security as part of the personnel staffing the
operation.

The Sunday Times called the whole operation "the

biggest surveillance sweep in recent years and pointed out in
blunt language that:
The British government wanted to know as much as
possible about the tactics and goals of each delegation - and sanctioned a massive operation to find
out. Phones were tapped. Hotel rooms were bugged.
Diplomatic communications were monitored. 'That was
why Lord Carrington could conduct the conference on
the basis of brinkmanship. The intelligence services
told him where the brinks were." 31
On December 21, 1979, the leaders of the Patriotic
Front (PF), Robert Mugabe of ZANU and Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU,
Bishop Abel Muzorewa representing the Salisbury administration, and Lord Carrington representing the British government, signed the Lancaster House Rhodesia Agreements.
fire date

of December 28 was determined and dates of

A cease-
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February 14 (for whites) and February 27, 28, 29 (for blacks)
were selected for elections.
Preceeding the signing itseLf were a series of events,
a listing of which serves to underscore the extent to which
the West acted in concert, with both flexibility and resolve
•

but also with deliberate speed to deliver a Lancaster House
agreement in the shortest time possible:
December 12

- The newly appointed British governor for
Rhodesia, Lord Soarnes, arrives Salisbury;
Zimbabwe Rhodesia becomes once again the
British colony of Southern Rhodesia.
- Britain ends sanctions against Rhodesia.

December 15

- Britain formally ends talks without the
signatures of the Patriotic Front leaders.

December 16

- President Carter in an executive action ends
US sanctions against Rhodesia. France and
Japan follow in several days.
(Britain and the
US formally condemned by a UN Security
Council vote for taking unilateral steps
to end what was a Security Council imposed
embargo.)

December 16.:...19

- After meetings with Front Line States
and major concessions by Lord Carrington
(suggested by the Commonwealth secretariat)
the PF agrees to sign the agreement.

The West, specifically the Carter and Thatcher administrations, necessarily had to emerge from the Lancaster House Conference with a new arrangement.

But it was not a matter of

dire necessity simply in order to prevent the liberation
struggle from corning to complete fruition with the possibility
of another Angola type final development.

No, the Lancaster

House Agreement involved much more than stemming the Zimbabwean
liberation struggle.

And it even involved more than dressing

up Muzorewa in a more militant garb and black facing his administration - this would

have materialized if the PF had walked out and
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the second class solution had been

adopted.

What was at

stake in Zimbabwe is what remains at stake in Southern Africa,
namely the containment of

the fi~es so as to prevent so

far-reaching a radicalization of the situation as to consume
the ultimate prize, the West's consummate partner nation,
•

apartheid South Africa.

What is of paramount importance is

that the . fundamental linkage between the capitalist machinery
and industry of the Euro-American world (and an accompanying
'kith and kin' racial bond) and apartheid South Africa be not
severed or altered in any fundamental way, Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher expressed it all cogently and neatly speaking
in New York City, mid-December 1979.

Calling her remarks "The West

in the World Today" she opened talking about how in this period,
where at any time the world economy could be shaken by political
upheaval,all shared "a direct practical interest in the orderly
settlement of political disputes."

She continued:

The Lancaster House Agreement could prove a major step
towards peaceful evolution and away from violent
revolution in Southern Africa. We are encouraged to
persevere with the Five Power initiative to achieve an
all-party settlement in Namibia.
In this context I want to say a particular word about
South Africa. There is now a real prospect that the
conflicts on South Africa's borders, in Rhodesia and
Namibia, will shortly be ended. This, combined with
welcome initiatives on South African domestic policies,
offer a chance to defuse a regional crisis which was
potentially of the utmost gravity, and to make progress
towards an ending of the i solation of South Af rica i n -world
affairs ." (Italics mine)3 2
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The Ceasefire . and the February 1980 Elections

I

By mid-morning the queue outside Harare's main
polling station stretches for a quarter of a mile.
In rural areas the first light of dawn reveals
lines of peasant voters extending to two or three
hundred metres. The contrast with last year's 'internal'
election is striking - the carnival staged to prove that
'your African' had no sympathy for 'external terrorists'
now yields to a definite demonstration of the popular will.
Down the ranks of voters sweeps wave after wave of jubilant
crowing and strutting in honour of ZANU PF's symbolic cock.
Grim-faced white police reservists recoil into mute gloom.
A truckload of black soldiers from the Rhodesian African
Rifles proceeds up Jameson Avenue crowing deliriously.
White shoppers avert their eyes. Mugabe, secure in the
countrysid.e, has clearly s·tonned Muzorewa' s urre.n ·stronghold - within
hours the Bishop will declare the elections a fraud and white citizens
will deliver themselves to yet another day of prayer. 33
In spite of British harassment of PF candidates, largely ZANU
candidates,

in spite of a strong South African military presence and

secret funding by both South African itnerests and multinational
capital, ZANU, led by Robert Mugabe, captured 62.992% of the
vote and 57 seats in the 100 member House of Assembly; ZAPU,
campaigning as the Patriotic Front, gained 24.113% of the
vote and 20 seats.

The reaction of Zimbabwe's white community

was like that of Britain's Prime Minister, stunned (the latter
in fact was so stunned that it took three days before she
could send a congratulatory telegram to the Prime Minister
elect).
But what made it possible?

Why was the Patriotic Front

given such a decisive mandate from the Zimbabwean electorate.
Some of

the answer to that question lies in the fact that

the people voted for the forces who they knew could end the
war because they recognized "the Boys" and only the Boys as
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the people who had conducted the war, who as well had participated with them in the war.

Another dimension of the answer

'
to that question, however, lies in the very manner in which
the British and their allies attempted to stage manage the
final production.

It is to this effort - consisting of the

manner in which the ceasefire and the election were carried
out - which I

would like now to address myself.

Under the terms of the Lancaster House Agreements Lord
Soames was responsible for both the maintenance of the cease-fire
arrangements and the administration of

the elections.

One

aspect of the cease-fire arrangements was placing the PF guerillas
in 16 designated assembly places, each assigned a 17 man team
of Commonwealth troops.

As of January 15, a month before the

elections, approximately 20,860 guerillas, 3/4 of which were
ZANU, had gathered at the assembly points. With a few exceptions the Commonwealth observer teams were impressed with the
orderliness and discipline characterizing the PF forces.
A key stipulation of the Lancaster House Agreements was
•

that all parties were to be confined to assembly areas.

But

Lord Soames only minimally monitored, however, the auxiliary
forces, called variously "The Spear of the Nation" or "The
Eye of the Nation", loyal largely to Bishop Muzorewa and
numbering 25 ·, 000.

Between November and the end of January

15,000 extra black auxiliaries were hired from among the
unemployed youth in the cities and country-side by the Muzorewa
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administration.

The Rhodesian government in the beginning

of December increased its defence budget an extra 19% to meet

'
accompanying costs like the training
of these auxiliaries by
regular Rhodesian army counter insurgency experts and mercenaries.
It was these forces, the auxiliaries who, i t was anticipated,
•

would be the force to turn the village population away from
supporting the PF contenders.

As a British journalist reported

from Salisbury in late November:
There is no doubt that the Auxiliaries will be deployed
in 'bases' throughout the country in an effort to
counter the presence of PF guerrillas who are now
hiding weapons and moving into villages throughout
the country. · 34
So too did Soames fail to regulate the various white units
of the Rhodesian security forces such as the Rhodesian air
force or the Selous Scouts.

Indeed, rather than curtailing

the mobility of the units of the Rhodesian colonial army,
Soames consistently ordered units like the Rhodesian Light
Infantry regiment into action on his behalf against groups of
guerrillas alleged - sometimes by the very same Rhodesian
security forces - to have violated the cease-fire accords. 35
It is important that we recall

that the activities of the

various Rhodesian forces set loose by the policies and actions
of the British governor were not confined to going after well-armed
guerrillas in the bush, "evening the score", as the Rhodesian soldiers
often described it. The objective was to intimidate the masses.
election time it was clear that most of the assassination
attempts,

the bombings and the shootings - many aimed at any

By
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and all black faces anywhere present - were the -work of such notorious
groups as the 1600 strong tracker and dirty tricks unit known
as the Selous Scouts.

In February · after a series of vicious

incidents including the bomb destruction of a Catholic missionary
press in Gwelo and finding the bodies of two Selous Scouts - one
black and one white - in an exploded

car, enough international

attention was mobilized to cause a steep reduction in the ·violent
acts by the Rhodesian incumbent forces.

But it took a threat to

break diplomatic relations with Britain by President Julius Nzerere
to get any serious response to the problem from the Thatcher
administration.
On January 13 Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere told
a group of party and government leaders in a speech in Dar es Salaam:
There must be someone to tell them the truth, just like
the child in the story of the emperor's new clothes who
told the truth, because sensible people would not say anything. Sensible people would not tell the British that
they are killing and that they are collaborating with
South Africa and that they are conspiring with Rhodesia and
that they are conspiring with Boers from two places,
Rhodesia and South Africa, to kill our young men. But
sensible people would not say anything. A fool must be
found to tell them this.
Therefore yesterday I complained to them. I wrote to the
British Prime Minister, telling her this was not what was
expected of them in Rhodesia and ... we still expect the
British to change their ways.
It wasn't the first time the question of the South African
presence had been raised.

On January 11, 1980, Nyerere on

behalf of the Frontline States had formally protested that the
South African presence in Rhodesia was a violation of the
settlement terms.

The issue involved more, he said, than the

·
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so-called Beit Bridge question - where South Africa had maintained
300 troops on the Rhodesian side of the bridge.

(Beit Bridge is

on the Limpopo River border between
, Rhodesia and South Africa.)
There remained the question of additional troops and that of
South African aircraft and pilots yet in Rhodesia.

Particularly

vexing was the question of South Africans in Rhodesian army
•

uniforms.

An American ex-Rhodesian mercenary, William Atkins,

had stated in December that "South Af'rica maintains as many as two
combat battallions of paratroopers and at least one squadron of
Mirage fighter bombers in Zimbabwe Rhodesia".
.

He further claimed

that "70% of Salisbury's paratroopers were trained in South
Africa, mainly at Bloemfontein". 36

Further, Colin Legum in

The Observer (January 20, 1980) had alleged that Lord Soames,
with

the authorization of Lord Carrington had entered into a

secret agreement with Pretoria.
Possibly no area of Lord Soames administration of Zimbabwe was
so revealing as was his handling of the South Africa question.
Throughout his four months in Zimbabwe he was confronted with
the question of why the British tolerated the South AFrican
presence.

It was an accusation which even the U.S. administration

candidly conceded was an accurate one. 37

Just as consistently

Soames or his spokespersons would deny the South African presence
as being any greater than the "small unit stationed with the
Governor's approval at Beit Bridge."*
*On March 11, 1980 British credibility received yet another nail
in its coffin when it was revealed. that "at least four companies of
South African troops together with at least two airborne units and
their equipment had returned to South Africa in the previous 56 hours.''
Clearly, their purpose had been to remain in the country preparatory
to a South African military action against the new Mugabe govenlffier1t. ,
A key question remains: how much did Britain ' s allies know about and cooperat e wi th
this? Was it a replay of Angola in 1975-76 when the ~lest, especially the USA,
hired South Africa as the "hatchet squad?" See arcong other articles: Bloom,
Bridget "South African Forces Withdrawing from Rhodesia", Financial Tirnes(London)
Tuesday, Saturday, March 1, 1980; "Pretoria Hawks Plan for Contingency of
Rhodesia Intervention", The Times (London) Thursday, February -21, 198@.
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Another controversial area was Lord Soames' administration
of

the elections procedure.

The Governor and his office by

delaying on the determination of a repatriation date made the
,

return of th~ 250,000-odd Zimbabwean refugees ~rom Mozambique the majority ZANU supporters - by election time difficult, it not
impossible.
•

(At the same time, on January 28 the Soames adminis-

tration provided an RAF Hercules for 62 dissident former Mugabe
party members released by the Mozambican government.) Further, by
declining to limit financing of any one party, the Governor
fa~ili tated_ Muzorew_a ' s _UANC~ s abili~ to attract. heavy fo:i;e~gn
financing (British industrialists alone raised $220,000 for
Muzorewa's April 79 election effort (Financial Times, December
20, 1979).

The South African government is said to have donated

enough secret funding to Muzorewa so as to buy one million votes
easily!

Both the Rhodesian Press and tpe government broadcas~i~q

services, the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Broadcasting Corp., chaired by
William Bassen (also chairman of the British American Tobacco
Company), also opt~d in favour of the Muzorewa forces.

News

commentaries consistently termed the PF "an external terrorist
alliance".

This pattern of bias prompted former Prime Minister

Garfield Todd to unsuccessfully request that the Foreign Office
remove the Rhodesian staff and substitute BBC personnel.
Soames and company turned a blind eye.

But

In the meanwhile, trans-

portation was a critical question especially since February
was the wettest month of the Rhodesian rainy reason.

The Soames

administration conveniently permitted the Muzorewa forces to
hire so many of the private buses - Over 800 - that the Commonwealth
monitoring force itself was often unable to get transport to move
the guerillas from their initial "rendez-vous points" to the
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"assembly areas".

Consistently, the Soames administration

attempted to curtail the ability of ZANU especially to
;

mobilize its supporters. When on January 27, a reliably estimated
crowd of 500,000 people gathered at the Highfield township near
Salisbury to hear Robert Mugabe speak, police and auxiliaries
stopped many busloads from attending, turning them back towards
the countryside.

This action was related to regular interventions

by security forces at the Governor• s instructions to prevent
ZANU campaign materials and Chartered British and Dutch planes
carrying medical supplies from ZANU support groups from landing
in either Salisbury or Bulawayo.
Because of the pattern of clear abuses and violations by the
British administration, like some of those catalogued above,
Quentin Peel writing in the Financial Times (London) of
January 8, 1980, observed:

~:

... the biggest danger to the visible impartiality of the
British exercise lies in its adoption of the entire
machinery of theRhodesian Government, with only a
skeleton staff under Lord Soames to monitor it.
That
machinery, both civil service and police, is deeply
committed to the retention of the status-quo and therefore
to the promotion of Bishop Muzorewa's UANC.
The final report of the Commonwealth observers team,

unanimouly adopted by the members from India, Canada, Nigeria,
Australia, Ghana, Barbados, Sierra Leon~, Bangladesh, Jamaica,
Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka, included the observations that
"Intimidation

[by the guerrilla forces] had been substantially

exaggerated" and that:
the election campaign was characterized by a number of
aberrations from the conditions envisaged by the
Lancaster House Agreements.
Most serious was the
failure of the Administration to treat the political
parties on an equal footing.38
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j

It is true that there were structural limitations, e.g.
a white civil service adamantly opposed to black rule, a highly

v

developed colonial economy, these aspects would have imposed
themselv·e s on any effort for constructing a just cease fire
and fair election.
.

But it is equally clear that the latter were

never the objectives of the Lancaster House exercise.

What

was intended was optimally to prevent the empowerment of the
Zimbabwean liberation movement, but at minimum to mold the political
and economic directions which that blossoming might assume.*
What ensued was that the Zimbabwean people in a free and fair
election united behind being tired of war and wanting their sons
and daughters to return home. **
*It is also clear that Britain would pay any price to do this.
,

'' '

-..
,

On 12 March previous British and South African denials were
negated when the SA Prime Minister Mr. P.W. Botha issued
a statement confirming that SA troops had been present in
Rhodesia during the pre-election period and were not
being withdrawn.
The text of the statement read:
"The
British authorities were aware of the presence of South
African men and equipment with the Rhodesian forces,
particularly with the view to facilitating the arrangements for the holding of orderly elections.
Immediately
after the elections, I announced that this assist~nce was
being withdrawn". (BBC 21.3.80)
HERITAGE OF WAR

**

•

Figures estimated with the help of relief
workers indicate that one in every four
Zimbabweans was killed, injured, dispossessed or displaced from his/ her
home during the war.
Estimates are:
27,500
Killed:
Injured:
275,000
750,000
Displaced persons:
Refugees:
225,000
In protected villages:
225,000
Lost their homes:
330,000
•
1,832,000
Total:
('Refugees' refers to those that have
fled to the front Iine states; 'displaced
persons' .to those that have become
squatters in Salisbury and other urban
areas.)
An estimated 500,000 young people
have missed years of education and are
without work, money or prospects

,

(Source: International Defence
and Aid Fund, FOCUS,
April 1900; page 9)
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A Forward Look The most difficult hours for Zimbabwe lie yet ahead.

Facing

the new Mugabe-led administration are a set of problems as
difficult as those ever faced by any newly independent country
anywhere in Africa.

A major problem is that of land re-distribution .

•

Consistently, the PF has said that the current circumstances wherein
some 6,682 white farms each have about 100 times more land than
some 675,000 farms in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL's) 39 will
be the first major issue they will tackle.

Thus, the Mugabe

administration must address itself .to this problem at a grave
point wherein most of the agricultural output in the economy
comes from the white farms.

And the transportation net work is

so arranged as to largely service the white farms.

In 1976 white

owned farms with nearly a fifth of the black population living
on them produced four-fifths of Rhodesia's agricultural output.
(The Times, April 18, 1980).
Edison Zvobgo, Zimbabwe's new Minister of Local Government
and Housing, identified another problem - an economic one when in an address to the African Chamber of Commerce in Salisbury,
he stated that "until we control our own natural resources and
pulse and breath of our economy, we remain only puppets."

But

in effect Dr. Zvobgo was speaking to two interrelated problems,
one being gaining control of the economy, the other being the
role of whites in the future Zimbabwean society.

To control the

economy Zimbabweans, black and white ones as well, will have to
assume many of the jobs now held by a white community that will
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leave (and as in Guinea, Algeria, Mozambique, Angola, will
destroy everything) before it shares its position with any blacks or more frightening yet, joins in , the destruction of that very
system of class privilege so carefully nutured into being.

With

each move made by ZANU the party, by the Mugabe administration, to
,

gain those jobs, there will be one more white who will get ready
to pull up stakes and turn Southwards or to other parts of the
world where white skin and colonial privilege remains intact.
Already the tensions are mounting around this problem.

And

at the time of writing (May 1980) some 35% of the key officers
in the army, some 200 white senior civil servants, among them seven
permanent secretaries, and some 1365 white police officers are
all expected to leave within the next six months.40

In the

meanwhile on May 19, the Manpower Minister, Mr. Edgar Tekere,
probably "riding point" for the entire Mugabe administration, but
aware of a high rate of black unemployment, announced his
intention to dismiss thousands of white civil servants because
they were over retirement age and were already drawing pensions. * 41
The whole matter of how the Mugabe administration will treat
the army is another entire article.
take take some time to resolve.
integrating

It is an ongoing saga

which

The work to be done in simply

the various Rhodesian units with the guerrilla forces

*Whether Tekere said, as Reuters claims, "They must realize that
I'm the boss, not them ... I'm not afraid of the conflict with them,"
remains to be demonstrated, What is definitely true, though, is
that Reuters has a long and distinguished background of distorting
and taking out of context statements made by government leaders in
Angola and Mozambique. Also, often those writing for the wire
services in Southern Africa have been themselves far too fond of
the pleasures of colonial privilege, the sundowners, the swimming
pools and the servants with the house, to be able to write as
"objective" journalists. For more information on this question the
reader is referred to a short but excellent narration of how news
is covered in Rhodesia and South Africa, done by the British National
Union of Journalists (NUJ) called Journalists: Repression and Truth
in Southern Africa, 1978, 20pp.
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is immense.

But integrating two sets of men - one including

some of the world's most v.icious mercenaries - who have been
fighting each other for 15 years 1s yet another story:

One

bold and imaginative attempt to treat the internal tensions
surrounding the army question and at the same time aid Mozambique
•

in its campaign to end armed hostilities against it is Mugabe's
recent decision to send members of the white Rhodesian Light
Infantry into action against the Mozambique dissidents (called
Mozambique Naional Resistance, MNR) who have been using Rhodesia
as their staging point and base area.

It is a bold mov·e by

Mugabe especially since there are strong ''kith and kin'', war
buddy linkages between the white Rhodesian security forces and
the Mozambican dissidents, many of

the latter being either

mercenaries, white Rhodesians, or white South Africans.
The bulk of the b1ozambique dissidents are of course either African
or Portuguese but many of them have served either in the Rhodesian,
South African or Portuguese colonial armies.
others

On this see (among

AAM, Fire Force Exposed, op cit., MacManus, James,

''Mugabe Orders White Infantry Action'', The Guardian (London),
May 26, 1980.)
In all these areas there lies the potential for disruption
and sabotage by external forces.

As with the economic problem

of a salaried sector too long starved by low wages and a galloping
14.5% inflation rate, the Zimbabwean race relations antagonisms

provide

an excellent terrain for planting mines.

Indeed recent

indications are that the South African government policy is to
do just that.

The Guardian (London) of April 25, 1980 quotes
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a white Rhodesian civil servant as saying, "South Africa's
whole policy towards Zimbabwe seems to be to encourage the
departure of whites, whatever their profession."
Add to all the above a sketch of the social situation, i.e.,
health services, educational possibilities, housing and what
•

emerges is a portrait of an ideal society for the colons but
a desperately vulnerable independent polity.

Recent Roman Catholic

Church studies and other research for instance, show the following:
- out of 1,200,000 African children who started primary
school education between 1959 and 1966 only 3,000 were
able to complete secondary schooling;
- the doctor patient ratio for European is 1 - 830 (not
too far short of Britain) whereas for Africans in the
rural areas it is 1 - 100,000;
- Salisbury hospitals which serve 8.7% of the population
receive 29.7% of the total health budget; 42
- As of 1969, 2.8 million Africans in the TTL~ occupied
440,000 dwellings with a total of 1.30 million rooms.
There was an average of 6 persons per dwelling and at
least two persons per room. Of the 873,200 private dwellings
occupied by Africahs in the provinces, districts and
main urban centers, 91% were without electricity and the
majority were built of traditional materials other than
bricks, concrete or asbestos. 43 *
But above all it is in the juncture of free Zimbabwe inheriting
an economy 70% in foreign hands, 44 and also one needing a minimum
of $5.0 billion dollars in aid during its first five years of
existence that I find that most perilous and slippery footing.
•

*There is in addition a significant amount of class differentiation
within the Zimbabwean African community. The form and intensity
of class struggle within Zimbabwe may be one of the most critical
questions of the future.
It is not, however, within the purview
of the present paper. The reader is referred, however, to some
of the excellent work done on this question by scholars at the
African Studies Center, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo,
Mozambique. Additionally, John Saul early raised some stirring question about the class composition of the Zimbabwean liberation move ment itself. See his recent book, The State and Revolution in
Eastern Africa, Monthly Review Press (1979).
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For already the Trilateralist West has begun to manipulate the
destiny of Zimbabwe by steadily reducing the amounts of aid they
will give or by delivering that aid through mechanisms known
for their delay and inefficiency.

One British newspaper recently

pointed out that 10% of the four year £75 million British aid
program will be administered through the European Development
Fund - known to many as "the slowest spending fund in the world

11
•

45

The USA is again the Trilateralist Deputy in this regard, too.
In fact the parallel slowness and paltriness of various Western
aid donors to the new Republic makes one wonder is there is a
concious, coordinated policy at work, namely management of

the

newly liberated country, stymmying a kind of domino-like radicalization of other areas by keeping Zimbabwe in a desperately poor
economic circumstance.

As the Washington correspondent of

the

Financial Times (London) commented:
The economic aid which the Carter administration is
now prepared to give $27 million in 1980-81 which would
be also shared with neighbouring countries like Zambia
and Mozambique hit hard by the long civil war - is relatively modest compared to the $1 billion of US aid
that was considered a couple of years ago under the
abortive (Kissinger-Ford initiated) Anglo-American Plan. 46
Why such a feeble sum?

The Carter administration, admitting

that the new Salisbury officials yet had not understood their
reasoning, explained that the "Administration line is now that
it makes sense to spread US aid around the other African regions,
because in the long term Zimbabwe should emerge as one of the
strongest economies in the area. 47
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on the positive side
Several recent events and dynamics/also should be summarized
before closing. The first is that the recent (Spring 1980)
Lusaka meeting and the Arusha Conference last year demonstrate
clearly that the Southern African countries have their "total
•

strategy'' just as does Prime Minister Botha and his Trilateralist
triends.

Part of the total strategy of

the liberated countries

of Southern Africa is to coalesce into a functioning and unified
regional entity, one capable of countering the present economic
stranglehold Boer South Africa maintains upon the region.

Secondly,

Zimbabwe is a state where a lot of planning has already been done.
Much of that planning was shaped by political directions coming
from ZANLA people then still in the bush. Thus that planning is rooted
in Zimbabwean realities, not the conjecturing fantasies of Western
Trilateralist so-called "scholars".
Finally, just as the process of political unifcation between
ZANU and ZAPU continues to unfold (a process which necessarily has
been long and will continue to be long and perhaps even more costly),
so, too, today do the Zimbabwean people learn afresh new forms of
political struggle; daily they absorb new conceptions of a rebuilt
Zimbabwean society.
Through the years the Zimbabwean cadre have demonstrated a
remarkable ability to assimilate the revolutionary experiences of
other peoples.

The ZANU of 1980 is long removed from the small

collection of individuals who used to be "the office" near Uhuru
Road in Dar Es Salaam.
In the UNCTAD document previously cited it is written in a
concluding chapter:
The new government of Zimbabwe cannot afford to repeat these
errors because its people have suffered enough tragedy, and
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•

for too long, in their struggle for political emancipation.
To avoid a repetition of such errors, the groundwork for
long-term development should be clearly established soon
after independence, even as t ~e new nation grapples with
the immediate problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation.
A clear definition of long-term development objectives of the direction in which the society is to move - will
promote a greater understanding among ordinary citizens of
the realities of the economic situation in the period of
transition, and of the sacrifices that may be needed at
all levels to sustain economic expansion in the future.49
This is indicative of the flexibility and skills, I think,
of the Zimbabwean liberation people at large.

The authors also

were probably reflecting on one of the writings of their
Mozambican comrade-in-arms Samora Machel who said in 1975, when
then discussing the future of his then newly independent country:
The State is not an eternal and immutable structure; the
State is not the bureaucratic machinery of civil servants,
nor something abstract, nor a mere technical apparatus.
The State is always the organized form through which a
class takes power to fulfill its interests. The colonial
State, an instrument of domination and exploitation by a
foreign bourgeoisie and imperialism which has already been
partially destroyed by the struggle, must be replaced by
a people's State, forged through an alliance of workers and
peasants, guided by FRELIMO and defended by the People's
Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique, a State which wipes
out exploitation and releases the creative initiative of
the masses and the productive forces.
In the phase of people's democracy in which we are now
engaged as a phase of the Mozambican revolutionary process,
our aim is to lay the material, ideological, administrative
and social foundations of our State. We need to be aware
that the apparatus we are now inheriting is, in its nature,
composition and methods, a profoundly retrograde and reactionary
structure which has to be completely revolutionized in order
to put it at the service of the masses ... The new battle is
only beginning.
50
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